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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CLINTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-459 
CLINTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
WYSSLING & MONTGOMERY (RICHARD H. WYSSLING of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Clinton Community College 
(College) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) on a unit clarification/placement petition filed by the Clinton 
Community College Faculty Association (Association). The Association has filed a 
response to the College's exceptions and cross-exceptions to the Director's decision.1 
The Director dismissed the unit clarification aspect of the petition because the 
Association's unit definition is largely title specific and none of the at-issue titles 
1This case was consolidated for hearing and decision with Case No. CP-476. 
The parties stipulated to the placement of all but one title, Technical Assistant -
Learning Center, in Case No. CP-476. No exceptions have been filed to the Director's 
inclusion of that title in the Association's unit and it is, therefore, not before us. 
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currently appear in the recognition clause of the parties' most recent collective 
bargaining agreement.2 No exceptions have been taken to this ruling of the Director 
and we, therefore, do not reach it. 
The Director granted the unit placement portion of the petition by placing the 
Executive Director of the Clinton Community College (CCC) Foundation, Academic 
Support Services Officer, Small Business Development Coordinator, Associate Dean 
for Learning Resource Center, Associate Dean for Business and Technology, Associate 
Dean for Enrollment Management, Financial Aid Officer, Assistant Dean for Student 
Personnel Services/Athletics and Athletic Facilities Management (Athletics), and the 
Learning Resource Specialist in the Association's unit. The College Relations Officer 
was not placed in the Association's unit because the Director found it to be a 
confidential position. The Assistant Bursars were excluded on the basis of the 
difference in the degree requirements for that position and the level of the job duties. 
The College argues in its exceptions that eight of the titles the Director placed in 
the Association's unit are managerial or confidential and should have been excluded 
2The Association's unit is defined in the parties' September 1, 1991 - August 31, 
1995 contract as: All full-time teaching faculty in the academic rank of instructor, 
assistant professor, associate professor or professor and those non-teaching faculty in 
the titles of Assistant in Continuing Education, College Nurse, College Registrar, 
Director of Counseling, Director of RSVP, IHEP Counselor, CEP/Individual Studies 
Program Coordinator, Continuing Education Coordinator, Student Personnel Counselor, 
Technician in Financial Aid, Director of Career Planning and Placement, Counselor for 
Special Services, Microcomputer Services Facilitator, Administrative Assistant for 
Enrollment Management and Librarians. 
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from the unit.3 In its cross-exceptions, the Association argues that the Director erred 
in excluding the College Relations Officer and the Assistant Bursars from its unit. In all 
other respects, the Association supports the Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the decision of the Director. 
In County of Rockland,4 we reiterated the standards to be utilized in a petition 
seeking to represent unrepresented employees when the employer argues that certain 
employees be excluded from the proposed unit because of their managerial or 
confidential duties. We there noted (at 3141-42): 
In determining whether a public employee should be deprived of 
representation rights, in either the context of a managerial/ 
confidential application or a representation petition, we are 
) controlled by the criteria set forth in the Act,5 as interpreted and 
applied in our decisions: 
The first criterion for managerial designation is 'Policy 
formulation.' An employee who either individually selects 
from among options those which are to be the objectives of 
a public employer in fulfilling its mission, and the methods 
and extent of meeting those objectives, or who regularly 
participates in the essential process resulting in such 
decisions, formulates policy within the meaning of the Act. 
A person who participates in that process in a clerical or 
advisory role or as a resource person does not satisfy that 
criterion. 
3No exceptions were taken to the Director's placement of the Learning Resource 
Specialist in the Association's unit and we, therefore, do not reach it. The parties also 
stipulated that the Administrative Assistant RSVP, Institutional Research Officer and 
Director of Management Information Systems should be excluded from the unit 
represented by the Association. The disposition of those positions is, iikewise, not 
before us. 
428PERB lf3063(1995). 
5Act, §201.7(a)(i)and(ii). 
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To satisfy the second criterion, participation in collective 
negotiations, an employee must be a direct participant in 
the preparation of the employer's proposals and positions 
in collective negotiations and an active participant in the 
negotiating process itself. Acting as an observer or 
resource person either at the table or in caucuses is 
insufficient. 
To satisfy the third criterion, an employee must have a 
major role in the administration of agreements, beyond that 
of a routine or clerical nature. He must have the authority to 
exercise independent judgment in effecting changes in the 
employer's procedures or methods of operation as 
necessitated by the implementation of agreements. 
Participation in the first level of the contract grievance 
procedures does not meet this criterion. 
The fourth criterion, exercising a major role in personnel 
administration, requires that an employee exercise 
independent judgment and fundamental control over the 
direction and scope of the employer's mission. A first step 
grievance role or the authority to hire or recommend the 
retention of employees could indicate supervision but 
would not satisfy this criterion. 
With respect to the foregoing, even those employees 
occupying what may fairly be termed a high-level 
supervisory role, do not necessarily fall within the 
"managerial" definition. (Footnote omitted) 
To be designated confidential, an employee must act in 
a confidential capacity to another employee who satisfies 
any of the latter three managerial criteria or be privy to 
labor relations information not intended for the eyes and 
ears of unit members or their representatives. (Footnote 
omitted). 
The Director initially found that the at-issue employees shared a professional 
community of interest with employees in the Association's unit, based upon their work 
location, benefit and salary levels, similarity in placement on the College's 
organizational chart and coverage by the College's policy and procedure manual, which 
would warrant their inclusion in the unit unless they met the criteria for exclusion as 
managerial or confidential employees. The record supports the Director's conclusion, 
except as to the Executive Director of the CCC Foundation and the Assistant Bursars, 
which will be discussed below. 
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We first address the position of the Executive Director of the CCC Foundation,6 
whom the Director found was an employee of the College and not managerial within the 
meaning of the Act. The Executive Director receives a College paycheck and 
participates in the College's health insurance and cafeteria plans. These factors, 
coupled with his placement on the College's organizational chart and his listing in the 
College Directory, were determined by the Director to warrant a finding that the 
Executive Director was an employee of the College. The College argues that the 
Executive Director of the CCC Foundation is not a College employee because 55% of 
his salary is paid by the CCC Foundation and he is both hired and evaluated by the 
Foundation. We find that the Executive Director is not appropriately placed in the 
Association's unit, as the record evidences that the Executive Director of the CCC 
) 
Foundation is at least jointly employed by the College and the Foundation. His terms 
and conditions of employment are controlled by both entities; his salary is paid from the 
funds of both, but he receives a College paycheck; and he participates in the College's 
health insurance plan, but he is hired and evaluated by the CCC Foundation. As the 
Executive Director is employed by an entity other than the College, that title cannot be 
ordered placed into a unit consisting of College employees only. 
The titles of Associate Dean for Learning Resource Center,7 Associate Dean for 
Business and Technology, Associate Dean for Enrollment Management and Assistant 
The CCC Foundation is a not-for-profit corporation 'which administers grants, 
bequests, devises, contributions and gifts for the purpose of benefitting the College. 
7This position had no permanent incumbent at the time of the hearing in this 
.) matter. The position is being filled by Patricia Miranda, the College Librarian, who is 
acting as the Associate Dean. 
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Dean for Athletics were dealt with collectively by the Director. Relying on the 
similarities of their job duties to the duties of the Division Coordinators8 and their 
placement on the same line on the College's organizational chart,9 the Director found 
that they were mid-level supervisors and placed them in the Association's unit. We 
disagree and find that they should be excluded from the Association's unit based upon 
their policy formulation and personnel administration responsibilities. 
The Associate and Assistant Deans report to either the Academic Dean or the 
Dean of Student Affairs. Each has responsibility for hiring, evaluating and disciplining 
staff in their departments, including faculty and staff who are currently in the 
Association's unit. Unlike the Division Coordinators, they are twelve-month, permanent 
employees, with no teaching responsibilities. The Associate Dean for Technology and 
Business, the Associate Dean for Learning Resources, the Associate Dean for 
Enrollment Management and the Assistant Dean for Athletics all have responsibility for 
the development, implementation and evaluation of College-wide policy in their 
respective areas, including the development of curriculum. They sit on the Academic 
•
8The position of Division Coordinator is an additional responsibility taken on by a 
faculty member for a yearly stipend. The work year is the same as the faculty work 
year, with the addition of two extra weeks of work in the spring and three additional 
weeks in the fall. The two-year appointments are made by the President of the College 
from among interested faculty in each of the following disciplines: Humanities, Social 
Science, Business and Technology, and Mathematics and Science. The Division 
Coordinators' primary responsibility is to prepare teaching assignments and schedules 
for each division, evaluate faculty and represent each division at appropriate meetings 
of College committees. 
Managerial designations are based upon duties actually performed or 
reasonably required, not the location of a position on an organizational chart. 
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Council as well as chairing various other committees. All represent the College on 
committees and at programs outside the College. 
We have previously found that the definition of a policymaker is, and must be, 
sufficiently broad to include those relatively few individuals who directly assist the 
ultimate decision-makers in reaching the decisions necessary to the conduct of the 
business of the governmental entity.10 The Associate and Assistant Deans are persons 
who regularly participate in and influence a process by which the College makes 
decisions regarding its mission and the means by which those policy goals and 
objectives can be best achieved. We have long considered such persons to be 
managers within the meaning of the Act.11 The Director's decision is, therefore, 
reversed as to the Associate Dean for Technology and Business, the Associate Dean 
for Learning Resources, the Associate Dean for Enrollment Management and the 
Assistant Dean for Athletics, who we find are not appropriately eligible for inclusion in 
the Association's unit because of their managerial status. 
The Academic Support Services Officer was placed in the Association's unit by 
the Director, who found that this title also was a mid-level supervisory position, similar 
to the Division Coordinators. The College argues that this position has a major role in 
personnel administration and policy formulation and should be excluded from the unit. 
The Academic Support Services Officer is a twelve-month position with no 
teaching responsibilities. The incumbent, Patricia Schick, reports to the Associate Dean 
™City of Lackawanna, 28 PERB 1J3043, at 3100 (1995). 
11See Town of Greece, 27 PERB fl3009 (1994); County of Cayuga, 20 PERB 
113024(1987). 
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for Learning Resources and is responsible for initiating, planning, directing, supervising 
and evaluating the College's academic support programs. She supervises several 
individuals within the Academic Assistance Center who are in the Association's unit and 
is responsible at the initial steps for discipline and scheduling. Because she reports to 
the Associate Dean, who possesses overall authority over the College's learning 
resource operations, we find that the Academic Support Services Officer does not set 
policy and is, therefore, not a managerial employee within the meaning of the Act. Our 
inquiry does not end there, however.12 
The unit placement petition in this case presents an initial uniting situation 
because it seeks representation rights for unrepresented employees. In such a 
situation, PERB must determine the most appropriate unit because 
[t]he statutory grant of authority to this Board to resolve disputes 
concerning representation status mandates this Board to define 
appropriate units (footnote omitted) and does not restrict its power 
simply to the approval or disapproval of units sought by the party or 
parties to the proceeding.13 
While Schick is not a managerial employee, we find that she is a high-level 
supervisor with a broad range of responsibility, who is not appropriately placed in a unit 
of employees under her supervision. We will not include a supervisor in a unit with 
rank-and-file employees over the objection of a party in interest if the degree and nature 
12See City Sch. Dist. of the City of Niagara Falls, 16 PERB 1J3039, aff'g 16 PERB 
114019(1983). 
13Stefe of New York, 1 PERB U 399.85, at 3231 (1968). 
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of the supervisory responsibilities indicate a conflict of interest/4 Here, Schick is 
responsible for the assignment of work, evaluation and discipline of unit employees and 
is not appropriately placed in the Association's unit. 
For the same reason, the Small Business Development Center Coordinator, 
Richard Christofferson, is not appropriately placed in the Association's unit. While 
reporting to the Associate Dean for Business and Technology, the Coordinator 
administers the New York State Small Business Development Center program at the 
College. In addition, as Coordinator, Christofferson hires, trains, supervises and 
evaluates the Small Business Development Center Advisors, which are unit positions. 
Like the Academic Support Service Officer, the Small Business Development Center 
Coordinator is a twelve-month position with no teaching responsibilities. It is, therefore, 
a supervisory position not appropriately placed in the Association's unit. 
The last of the positions the Director included in the Association's unit is the 
Financial Aid Officer. It is also a twelve-month position with no teaching responsibilities. 
The Financial Aid Officer administers all financial aid programs at the College and 
reports directly to the Dean for Student Affairs. The incumbent, Karen Goodrich, 
supervises one Financial Aid Technician, a position in the unit represented by the 
Association, and two clerical positions, not included in the Association's unit. She 
hires, evaluates, disciplines and schedules the employees in her office. For the same 
reasons which warranted the exclusion of the Academic Support Services Officer and 
uEastRamapo Cent. Sch. Dist, 11 PERB fi3075 (1978); City Sch. Dist. of 
the CityofBinghamton, 10 PERB p062 (1977); New York State Div. of State Police, 
1 PERB H399.32(1968). 
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the Small Business Development Center Coordinator from the Association's unit, the 
petition with respect to the Financial Aid Officer must also be dismissed 
The Association excepts to the Director's decision to deny its petition to place the 
College Relations Officer and the Assistant Bursars in its unit. The Director determined 
that the College Relations Officer was a confidential employee within the meaning of 
the Act because the incumbent, Eileen Walker, is privy to discussions about the 
College's bargaining positions. The Association argues that the record shows that on 
only one occasion was Walker a part of a discussion as to whether the College should 
respond to an Association release about negotiations that had appeared in a local 
newspaper. Jeffrey Ramelb, the College's Human Resources Officer, testified that he 
is involved with negotiations for the College and that he and the President of the 
College or the College's labor relations counsel regularly consult with the College 
Relations Officer after each negotiating session to discuss the need and content of any 
press releases related to negotiations. During the course of these discussions, the 
College's proposals, strategies and ultimate position on negotiations are revealed to the 
College Relations Officer. That Ramelb could only recall one incident with specificity 
does not mean that the College Relations Officer has only been privy to these 
discussions on that one occasion. Ramelb's testimony that Walker is involved on a 
regular basis in discussions with the College's President or labor relation's counsel 
about press releases related to the College's negotiating strategies and ultimate 
positions is largely undisputed and supports the Director's conclusion that Walker is a 
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confidential employee whose position is not appropriately placed in the Association's 
bargaining unit.15 
Finally, the Director also determined that the title of Assistant Bursar was not 
appropriately placed in the Association's unit because its duties are of a clerical nature 
and its educational requirements are not of the same level as the other employees in 
the unit. The College sought their exclusion on the basis of their exposure to 
confidential labor relations information but has filed no exceptions to the Director's 
decision as it relates to this position. The Association argues in its exceptions that the 
duties of the Assistant Bursars are not clerical and that other employees in the 
Association's unit have the same or lesser degree requirements. 
A review of the record shows that the three Assistant Bursars are twelve-month 
employees who report to the College Bursar. They are required to possess an 
associates degree. Their duties include accounting for and reporting of student 
accounts; preparation of fund balance and analysis, budget projections and analysis, 
salary and benefit projections; maintenance of cash flow, including all banking 
responsibilities; and maintenance, calculation and processing of the College payroll. 
There is some testimony in the record by the Bursar, Diane Merkel, that at the request 
of the College's labor relations counsel, she had requested the Assistant Bursars to 
prepare "projections for the fund balances" and "salary and benefit projections for 
negotiations", and that these figures were for the College's Board of Trustees to use in 
analyzing negotiations positions. Without more, the indication that one or more of the 
^Somers Cent. Sch. Dist, 14 PERB 1J3058 (1981); Yonkers Public Library, 
11 PERB H3091 (1978); Niagara Wheatfield Cent. Sch. Dist, 11 PERB fi4044 (1978). 
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Assistant Bursars did fund balance and salary and benefit projections is insufficient to 
warrant a finding that one or more of them is a confidential employee.16 
The record, however, does not support a finding that others in the Association's 
unit do or do not perform similar duties or have similar degree requirements. There are 
titles included in the Association's unit, such as Technician in Financial Aid or Student 
Loan Advisor, for example, which appear similar, but there is no evidence in this record 
as to the job duties or degree requirements for these and other unit positions which 
may or may not be similar to the Assistant Bursar. The matter must, therefore, be 
remanded to the Director for further processing to obtain evidence regarding the duties 
and degree requirements of other titles in the unit. 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions of the College are granted, the decision 
of the Director is reversed, and the petition is dismissed regarding the titles of the 
Academic Support Services Officer, Small Business Development Coordinator, 
Associate Dean for Learning Resource Center, Associate Dean for Business and 
Technology, Associate Dean for Enrollment Management, Financial Aid Officer, and the 
Assistant Dean for Student Personnel Services/Athletics and Athletic Facilities 
Management (Athletics). The exception of the Association as to the College Relations 
Officer is denied and the decision of the Director is affirmed as to that position. The 
16See CitySch. Dist. of the City of Glen Cove, 18 PERB H4085, at 4155 (1985), 
aff'd, 19 PERB P017 (1986). See also County of Rensselaer (Hudson Valley 
Community College), 17 PERB 1J4060, at 4097 (1984), aff'd in other respects, 18 PERB 
113001 (1985). 
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case is remanded to the Director to take further evidence consistent with our holdings 
herein regarding the Assistant Bursars. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19117 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ., GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE, EISMAN, & READY (CATHERINE V. BATTLE of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge that the County of Nassau 
(County) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it unilaterally adopted a policy of imposing specific penalties on employees who tested 
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positive for drug or alcohol use. The County interposed the affirmative defenses of 
lack of jurisdiction and waiver.1 
The ALJ dismissed the charge because the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement contained clauses which granted the County the right to impose discipline, 
including the right to suspend without pay or to terminate an employee. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that disciplinary procedures and 
penalties are mandatory subjects of negotiation and that the County must negotiate a 
change from a general to a specific discipline procedure. The County supports the 
ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
CSEA presented evidence that prior to March 1997, employees who tested 
positive for drug or alcohol use were sometimes not disciplined at all and sometimes 
were counseled, suspended or, if the offense was the employee's fifth one, terminated. 
In March 1997, CSEA became aware that the County had instituted a new policy which 
provided that for the first positive drug or alcohol test or intoxication, an employee could 
be suspended without pay for twenty days, be referred to the Employee Assistance 
Program, be required to undergo treatment and/or counseling and test negative before 
he or she could return to work. Failure to fulfill any of these requirements, or a second 
1The County has withdrawn its timeliness defense and has filed no cross-
exceptions to the ALJ's dismissal of its jurisdiction defense. 
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positive drug or alcohol test result within three years, would result in the employee's 
immediate termination. 
Section 4 of the parties' most recent collective bargaining agreement reserves to 
the County the right to take disciplinary action. Section 10 is a fairly detailed 
disciplinary procedure, providing, in relevant part: 
10-5 Notice of and Charges. An employee who is entitled to the 
protections of this section shall, within 20 calendar days of the 
imposition of a penalty, be served with written notice of the 
discipline and charges of incompetence and/or misconduct either 
in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the 
employee's current address as it appears on the County's 
personnel records. If the employee wishes to contest said 
discipline, the employee must proceed in accordance with the 
Disciplinary Review Procedure set forth in this section. A copy of 
such notice and charges shall simultaneously be served upon the 
Union. 
10-6 Discipline may consist of and shall be limited to a reprimand, 
and/or a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100), and/or a 
denial of the next years (sic) scheduled increment, and/or a loss 
of leave entitlements not to exceed thirty (30) days, a suspension 
without pay, and/or demotion in grade and/or step, and/or 
dismissal from County service. 
10.6-1 A discharge, or a suspension without pay in excess of 
thirty (30) days, shall entitle the Union to proceed directly to Step 
3 of the Disciplinary Review Procedure for expedited arbitration. 
10-7 (a) For any incompetence or misconduct alleged to have 
occurred prior to January 1, 1995, and described in the notice 
and charges, no discipline may be imposed more than eighteen 
(18) months after such occurrence unless said incompetence or 
misconduct would, if proved in a court of competent jurisdiction, 
constitute a crime. 
(b) For any incompetence or misconduct alleged to have occurred 
on or after January, 1995, and described in the notice and 
charges, no discipline may be imposed more than one (1) 
calendar year after such occurrence unless said incompetence or 
misconduct would, if proved in a court of competent jurisdiction, 
constitute a crime. 
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The grounds for the imposition of discipline and the penalties which may be 
invoked constitute mandatory subjects of negotiation under the Act.2 An employer 
which unilaterally changes a general, sporadically enforced discipline policy to a 
specific, enforced discipline policy violates §209-a.1(d) of the Act, absent a. controlling 
defense.3 The County, therefore, violated the Act by unilaterally changing an informal 
and general discipline procedure for positive drug and alcohol test results to a strictly 
enforced procedure with fixed penalties unless there is merit to any of its defenses. 
The ALJ found that CSEA had waived its right to negotiate the imposition of 
disciplinary penalties by agreeing to §10 of the collective bargaining agreement. 
Although not incorrect, as we noted recently in County of Nassau (Police Department)4, 
the defense of waiver by agreement is most often better characterized as duty 
satisfaction: 
We take the opportunity at the outset of our decision to clarify 
the nature of a defense grounded upon a claim that the subject(s) 
sought to be bargained pursuant to a charging party's demand 
have already been negotiated to completion. This Board's 
decisions have sometimes characterized this defense as duty 
satisfaction, sometimes waiver by agreement, and sometimes 
simultaneously both duty satisfaction and waiver. Although the 
second and third characterizations cannot be considered wholly 
inaccurate, we believe that the first most accurately describes the 
true nature of this particular defense. 
2Solvay Teachers Ass'n, 28 PERB ^3024 (1995); City of Glens Falls, 24 PERB 
H3015 (1991); City of Buffalo, 23 PERB fi3050 (1990); New York City Transit Auth., 
20 PERB H3037, cont'd, 147 A.D.2d 574, 22 PERB 1J7001 (2d Dep't 1989), enf'd, 
156 A.D.2d 689, 23 PERB 1J7002 (2d Dep't 1989). 
3State of New York (Office of Mental Health-Central New York Psychiatric Ctr.), 
31 PERB 1J3051 (1998). 
431 PERB H3064(1998). 
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Waiver concepts suggest that a charging party has surrendered 
something, (footnote omitted) Although waiver may accurately 
describe a loss of right, such as one relinquished by silence, 
inaction, or certain other types of conduct, the defense as 
described is not one under which a respondent is claiming that the 
charging party has suffered or should be made to suffer a loss of 
right. Under this particular defense, a respondent is claiming 
affirmatively that it and the charging party have already negotiated 
the subject(s) at issue and have reached an agreement as to how 
the subject(s) is to be treated, at least for the duration of the 
parties' agreement. By expressing this particular defense as duty 
satisfaction, we give a better recognition to the factual 
circumstances actually giving rise to it and expect to avoid the 
confusion and imprecision in analysis which have sometimes been 
caused by the other noted characterizations of this defense. 
What we said about the true nature of waiver by agreement is equally true of 
what has been characterized as a contract reversion defense. As exemplified by State 
of New York-Unified Court System5, an employer is privileged 
to revert to the terms of its collective bargaining agreement 
notwithstanding an inconsistent past practice. Our theory [is] that 
having reached an agreement on a subject matter, that agreement, 
not any practice with respect thereto, fixed and controlled the terms 
and conditions of employment. In effect, despite the reversion from 
practice to the contract terms, the status quo was nonetheless 
maintained. 
Like waiver by agreement, a contract reversion defense is also appropriately 
characterized as a duty satisfaction defense. An employer raising a contract reversion 
defense is claiming that it and the representative of its employees have already 
bargained and reached agreement on a subject. Having done so, the employer is 
privileged to act pursuant to that negotiated agreement, notwithstanding a practice to 
the contrary. The same argument forms the essence of a duty satisfaction defense. An 
employer, having bargained and reached an agreement with an employee organization 
526 PERB 1J3013, at 3025 (1993). 
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as to how a subject is to be treated, cannot be held to have acted unilaterally in 
violation of the Act when it takes an action allowed by the agreement. Its duty to 
negotiate has been satisfied. Whether the defense is articulated as waiver by 
agreement or contract reversion, they are both differently phrased principles of duty 
satisfaction. 
Here, the County has not violated the Act by changing from a non-contractual 
discipline procedure to the discipline procedure set forth in its contract with CSEA 
because it is the contract, not the extra-contractual practice, which fixes and determines 
the employees' terms and conditions of employment.6 That the County may not have 
previously utilized this contractual procedure for employees who test positive for drug or 
alcohol use does not affect our decision.7 
Based on the foregoing, we deny CSEA's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
{A&.(_/I> 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Mace A. Abbott, Member 
6Town of Greece, 28 PERB 1J3078 (1995); Maine-Endwell Cent Sch. Dist, 
15 PERB 1J3025 (1982). 
7Village of Scotia, 29 PERB 1J3071, at 3171 (1996), conf'd, 241 A.D.2d 29, 
31 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't 1998), where we held that "An employer does not unilaterally 
change a disciplinary system grounded upon misconduct by charging an employee with 
misconduct upon specifications which have not arisen before." 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Charging Party, x 
- and - CASE NO. U-19970 
WAPPINGERS FEDERATION OF WORKERS, 
Respondent. 
DONOGHUE, THOMAS, AUSLANDER & DROHAN (JOHN M. DONOGHUE 
and STUART S. WAXMAN of counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Wappingers Central School 
District (District) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). The Director dismissed as deficient the District's charge 
against the Wappingers Federation of Workers (Federation) in which the District alleges 
that the Federation violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by insisting upon a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. The District has 
proposed at fact-finding to delete from any successor agreement Article III, §Kofthe 
parties' expired contract, which the District characterizes as a job security and minimum 
staffing clause. As alleged by the District, the Federation has responded to its demand 
with a counter proposal to continue this clause unchanged in any successor agreement 
and it is this proposal which is the basis for the District's charge. 
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The Director dismissed the charge because it did not set forth any facts 
supporting the District's allegation that the Federation had actually submitted any 
proposal concerning Article III, §K for consideration at fact-finding. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the Director's decision is incorrect as a 
matter of fact and law and is illogical. The Federation has not responded to the 
exceptions. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the Director's decision. 
A party violates its duty to bargain in relevant respect by insisting upon the 
negotiation of a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. Insistence in relevant context is 
the presentation of a demand concerning an allegedly nonmandatory subject at or after 
fact-finding.1 
We have no occasion to consider the negotiability of Article III, §K.2 Even 
assuming that the content of Article III, §K is not mandatorily negotiable, there are 
no facts pleaded to evidence that the Federation submitted any demand concerning 
Article III, §K for consideration by the fact finder. 
The Federation's articulated opinion that the content of Article III, §K is 
mandatorily negotiable does not evidence or establish that it has any proposal 
regarding that subject pending at fact-finding. Similarly, although Article III, §K was 
negotiated by the parties before fact-finding, and was actually the subject of a tentative, 
but ultimately rejected agreement, the voluntary negotiation of any subject before fact-
1£.g., Pipe Caulkers and Repairmen's Local No. 18029, 23 PERB 1J3047 (1990). 
2Having assumed that Article III, §K encompasses nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation, we need not consider whether the conversion theory of negotiability 
adopted recently in City of Cohoes, 31 PERB p 0 2 0 (1998), should apply to 
negotiations involving the employees of a school district. 
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finding does not evidence or establish that either party has presented that subject at or 
after fact-finding. Should the Federation actually submit a demand to continue Article 
III, §K unchanged, there will be adequate opportunity for the District to pursue a charge 
against the Federation at that time. Therefore, there is no reason to strain to find 
insistence when that will manifest itself in due course of the fact-finding process should 
there be a presentation of a nonmandatory demand. 
The District's argument that the Director's decision is inconsistent with the prior 
Director's decision in County of Suffolk* is incorrect. In that earlier case, the Director 
correctly observed that a union would violate its duty to negotiate if it were to submit a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation for consideration at fact-finding. Here, the 
Director, again correctly, dismissed this charge because no facts were pleaded to 
evidence that the Federation had submitted any proposal regarding Article III, §K to 
fact-finding. 
The District also argues that the Director's decision "defies logic" because it 
causes nonmandatory items in an agreement to be continued forever without an 
opportunity for it to negotiate. The District's argument is unpersuasive for a number of 
reasons. By not filing a charge against the District, as it could have, the Federation has 
actually permitted the District's proposal to be considered by a fact finder, thereby 
furthering the negotiation process. Moreover, the District's argument in this regard is 
inconsistent with the very charge it has filed. The District has a proposal to delete 
Article III, §K from any successor agreement. By this charge, the District seeks to 
327 PERB U4581 (1994). 
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prevent the Federation from presenting any counter proposals to its demand, thereby 
stifling the very negotiations which it claims to want. Finally, the Director's decision 
does not state or imply anything about the District's obligation to continue Article III, §K 
after expiration of the parties' contract. The District's unilateral discontinuation or 
modification of an expired term of the parties' agreement would be the subject of an 
improper practice charge by the Federation against the District. The issue is not 
presented by the District's charge against the Federation. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions are denied and the 
Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York Cu,. 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHARLES ACEVEDO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-12386 
CATSKILL REGIONAL OFF-TRACK BETTING 
CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
HOLLIS GRIFFIN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MARK D. STERN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated January 25, 1995,1 the Catskill Regional Off-Track Betting 
Corporation (OTB) was held to have violated §209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it terminated the employment of Charles 
Acevedo in retaliation for his exercise of rights protected by the Act. OTB was ordered 
to reinstate Acevedo to his former position as a branch supervisor at OTB's "Sloatsburg 
office", where he had last worked, with back pay. That order has been enforced.2 A 
fact not of record, and unknown to the Board when it issued its order, is that OTB had 
128 PERB 1J3002 (1995). 
229 PERB 1J7013 (Sup. Ct. Alb. County 1996), appeal dismissed, 30 PERB 
H7004 (3d Dep't 1997). 
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closed the Sloatsburg branch office before the Board's decision. After OTB refused to 
appoint Acevedo to a comparable position at another branch, we moved for a judicial 
order of contempt. That motion was denied upon the Court's conclusion that it is not 
possible for OTB to comply with the literal terms of the order because the office named 
in the order has been closed. The matter was simultaneously remanded to us for 
reconsideration of the relief ordered.3 This decision issues pursuant to the Court's 
remand. 
Our guiding remedial policy is to place an aggrieved employee in the position 
that the employee would have been in had a violation of the Act not occurred.4 The 
order as originally entered was intended to make Acevedo fully whole for the violations 
found to have been committed by OTB and should be read to conform to that intent. 
The reference to the Sloatsburg branch was not limiting. Rather, it simply reflected the 
facts as the record disclosed them to be as of that date. Acevedo obviously is not 
made whole for the violations found to have been committed if he would have been 
continued in employment with OTB, notwithstanding the closing of the Sloatsburg 
branch. 
Acevedo alleges that OTB has a policy and practice of reassigning employees 
elsewhere within the corporation when any of its branches are closed. Although OTB has 
not specifically denied Acevedo's assertions in this respect, it claimed in the judicial 
proceeding that other employees were not reassigned when two different branches closed. 
3PERB v. CatskillReg. Off-Track Betting Corp., 31 PERB 1J7014 (Sup. Ct. Alb. 
County 1998). 
AE.g., Village of Greenport, 26 PERB 1J3067 (1993). 
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These allegations raise disputed questions of fact as to whether OTB, at any relevant 
time, has had a policy or practice of reassigning employees in positions comparable to 
that formerly held by Acevedo when it closes a branch and, if so, the particulars of such 
policy or practice. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation for the appointment of an Administrative 
Law Judge to make a report to the Board containing the findings of fact in these 
respects and any such others as may be relevant to whether Acevedo has been made 
whole for the violations found to have been committed by OTB. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/fa ^^M 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
L^il^jC 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CARMEL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19QQ1 
CARMEL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
RAYMOND G. KUNTZ, P.C. (RAYMOND G. KUNTZ of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (JOHN J. NAUN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Carmel Central School District 
(District) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, the ALJ 
dismissed the District's charge against the Carmel Teachers Association (Association). 
The District alleges in this charge that the Association refused to negotiate in good faith 
in violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when the 
Association's president sent a letter he wrote to the private employer of the president of 
the District's board of education. As alleged by the District, the letter threatens the 
private employer with economic consequences in an attempt to cause the District to 
change the positions it had taken in negotiations with the Association. 
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The ALJ dismissed the charge upon the Board's decision in Wappingers 
Congress of Teachers^ (hereafter Wappingers). The ALJ read Wappingers to leave 
activity of the type at issue unregulated under the improper practice provisions of the 
Act. Upon this basis, the ALJ did not decide whether the Association could be held 
accountable for its president's letter or whether the letter was, as alleged, an attempt to 
influence the parties' negotiations. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the Association should be held in 
violation of the Act because its agent did not merely express an opinion regarding the 
president of the board of education's character or reputation as was the circumstance in 
Wappingers. Rather, he threatened an entity not involved with the parties' negotiations 
with economic consequences unless its employee, the board of education president, 
caused the District to treat the Association more favorably in negotiations for a 
successor collective bargaining agreement. 
The Association argues in response that its president's letter involved a private, 
personal dispute, unrelated to negotiations, for which it is not legally accountable. It 
argues that even on the assumptions made by the ALJ, the letter is a lawful pressure 
tactic under Wappingers. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
The president of the District's board of education is employed by a private 
investment firm. The letter in issue was drafted solely by the Association's president, 
127PERB 1J3033 (1994). 
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was signed by him in that capacity, and was sent to a branch manager of the 
investment firm. The text of the letter is as follows: 
I am writing to you in both my capacity as President of the Carmel Teachers' 
Association (C.T.A.) and as a delegate to the New York State United Teachers 
(NYSUT). In my former capacity I represent 330 active teachers and 
approximately 100 retirees. In my latter capacity, I am a representative of 
370,000 active teachers in New York State and approximately 100,000 retirees. 
Many teachers invest and Smith Barney could certainly benefit from this 
potential pool of investors. In this regard, I have a problem about a 
member of your office staff that I believe you can assist me with. A 
member of your staff, Joe DiVestea, is the President of my local school 
board. Recently I have observed Mr. DiVestea exhibiting difficulty 
discerning truth from fabrication. He reported a 7.3% raise to some 
individuals as a 3.0% raise so as to mislead our community. He has 
developed a habit of disguising the truth and either lying outright or 
playing word games to deliberately mislead people. In essence, his 
credibility and honesty are questionable. I have spoken to him personally 
regarding his image. He has countered by denying his actions and 
seeking to assassinate my character. 
I would like to believe that Smith Barney does not encourage its staff to lie 
and deceive your clients and certainly not create an image wherein 
credibility is even doubted. However, my beliefs aside, I am asking you to 
clarify your position regarding the veracity of your staff and their credibility. 
As a delegate to the NYSUT Representative Assembly, I intend to ask 
NYSUT to address this issue. If Smith Barney endorses its staff 
projecting an image of doubtful credibility, I would ask that NYSUT inform 
our 370,000 members and retirees of this policy. Our Representative 
Assembly will meet in the first week of May and I would appreciate 
hearing from you regarding your position about Mr. DiVestea's character 
well prior to that meeting. 
I would appreciate a response in writing but can be reached at...in the 
event you feel it advisable to give me a call. Awaiting your response... 
Wappingers, although distinguishable on its facts, is nonetheless dispositive on 
its rationale. In Wappingers, the union had depicted the employer's agents with 
unflattering caricatures. The District is correct that Wappingers did not involve any 
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threat against a neutral third party and we find that the letter at issue in this case 
contains at least an implied threat that the Association's president would try to use 
whatever influence he had with the Association and its state-wide affiliate to stop unit 
employees and others from investing with the private firm. Far less clear is whether the 
letter was sent, as the District claims, to influence negotiations, or whether, as the 
Association claims, the letter was a manifestation of a private, personal dispute 
between two individuals unrelated to negotiations. The ALJ made no findings in this 
regard because it was not necessary, given the basis for her decision, and it is equally 
unnecessary for us to remand the case to the ALJ for those findings. Even if the 
purpose underlying the letter is as the District alleges it to be, and even if the 
Association is responsible for the letter authored by its president under some agency 
theory, the content of the letter is not an unlawful refusal to negotiate. 
As Wappingers makes clear, the Act regulates the economic pressure tactics 
parties may use in negotiations to the extent it prohibits striking. As striking is itself 
prohibited, we have also held that the threat to engage in that illegal activity is a refusal 
to negotiate.2 Other threats of economic consequence, whether to a party to the 
bargaining relationship or strangers thereto, are left unregulated by the Act. To the 
extent the District is correct in characterizing the letter as secondary activity, that type of 
activity is closely regulated pursuant to very extensive and detailed statutory provisions 
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).3 Only last month, we declined to 
zEast Meadow Teachers'Ass'n, 16 PERB 1J3086 (1983). 
3We do not suggest, however, that a union's threat to stop doing business with 
an enterprise is secondary activity or that it would be unlawful under NLRA. 
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process a unit clarification/placement petition,4 in part because neither the Act nor our 
Rules of Procedure contains provisions regarding work assignment disputes similar to 
those under the NLRA. The total absence of any statutory provisions regarding threats 
of the type made by the Association's president to the investment firm is persuasive 
evidence5 that the legislature has not seen that this type of pressure tactic is one 
requiring prohibition or regulation under a labor relations statute. 
What was said in Wappingers is equally true in this case: 
[A] negotiating relationship always includes myriad pressures which are 
specifically intended to cause a party to change its position on a matter involving 
some aspect of the employer-employee relationship. Labor negotiations under 
the Act are fundamentally all about pressure in one form or another. Only when 
conduct at or away from the bargaining table becomes unlawful does the Act 
seek to regulate or curtail that conduct.6 
) This charge must be dismissed because, even on the assumptions most 
favorable to the District, it does not constitute a refusal to negotiate in good faith. By 
dismissing the charge, we do not, of course, condone the conduct by the Association's 
president, whether in an official or personal capacity, and do not express any opinion as 
to whether the type of conduct at issue here should be made an improper practice or 
whether the letter is otherwise actionable. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions are denied and the 
ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
4Nassau Community College and County of Nassau, 31 PERB 1J3059 (1998). 
5See Rosen v. PERB, 72 N.Y.2d 42, 21 PERB 1J7014 (1988). 
627 PERB H3033, at 3078. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UTICA PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 32, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-19829 
CITY OF UTICA, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO & GRASSO (JANE K. FININ of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (JAMES W. ROEMER, JR., and 
JEFFREY S. HARTNETT of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Utica Professional Firefighters 
Association, Local 32, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Association) to a decision by the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director). The 
Association alleges in this charge that the City of Utica (City) submitted several 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation to compulsory interest arbitration in violation of 
§209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The Assistant 
Director held all of the City's demands to which exceptions are taken to be mandatory 
subjects of negotiation. These demands fall into two categories. All but one of the 
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City's demands (1, 42, 43, 46, 51, 54 and 60) are proposals to delete or modify1 
language contained in the parties' expired agreement. The other City demand (66) is 
for a random urinalysis drug testing procedure. 
The Assistant Director based his decision upon our recent decision in City of 
Cohoes2 (hereafter Cohoes). In Cohoes, we held that the lawful terms contained within 
a collective bargaining agreement between a municipality and a union representing that 
municipality's police officers or fire fighters are terms and conditions of employment by 
virtue of their inclusion in that agreement, even if those terms would not be mandatorily 
negotiable according to their inherent subject nature. We also held in Cohoes that the 
negotiability of employer demands for waivers or modifications of employees' statutory 
rights is to be assessed under the same standards as have been used to assess the 
negotiability of like demands by unions upon employers. If the demand embraces a 
term and condition of employment, it is mandatorily negotiable unless there is a clearly 
contrary public policy or legislative intent. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the Assistant Director's decision 
should be reversed because Cohoes was wrongly decided and incorrectly applied by 
the Assistant Director. The City supports the Assistant Director's decision as a correct 
application of Cohoes, itself correctly decided. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the Assistant Director's 
decision as to the negotiability of all of the demands in issue except demand 66, make 
1
 Demand 60 would change all contractual references to the "Deputy Chief to the 
"Shift Administrator". 
231 PERB H3020(1998). 
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no negotiability determination as to demand 66, and remand the case to the Assistant 
Director for further proceedings. 
An assessment of the negotiability of all of the City's demands except number 66 
involves only a simple application of the supplemental theory of negotiability we 
adopted in Cohoes. All of these demands are mandatorily negotiable because they 
target contract language for elimination or modification. In affirming the Assistant 
Director, we reaffirm Cohoes in relevant part and its underlying rationale. 
The City's proposed drug testing procedure implicates employees' constitutional 
rights.3 The Association argues that Cohoes does not require negotiation or arbitration 
about waivers of constitutional rights. It is not necessary, however, for us to decide 
whether that part of Cohoes concerning the negotiability of employer demands for 
waivers or modifications of employee statutory rights is properly extended to waivers or 
modifications of unit employees' constitutional rights. 
The assumption underlying the Association's argument is that the testing 
proposed by the City is unconstitutional. This is not necessarily correct. The 
nonconsensual, random drug testing of persons employed in safety sensitive positions 
can be constitutional.4 If the drug testing proposed is constitutional, there is no waiver 
of any rights. That part of Cohoes concerning the negotiability of demands for waivers 
3Delaraba v. Nassau County Police Dep't, 83 N.Y.2d 367, 27 PERB fl7507 
(1994); Caruso v. Ward, 72 N.Y.2d 432, 21 PERB 1J7520 (1988); Patchogue-Medford 
Congress of Teachers v. Bd. ofEduc. of the Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist, 
70 N.Y.2d 57, 20 PERB 1J7505 (1987); City of Buffalo (Police Dep't), 20 PERB P048 
(1987). 
4E.g., Seelig v. Koehler, 76 N.Y.2d 87 (1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 847 (1991). 
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or modifications of rights is simply not triggered if the proposed drug testing is 
constitutional. As constitutional drug testing procedures are terms and conditions of 
employment,5 City demand 66 would be one properly submitted for disposition by the 
arbitration panel. 
Conversely, demand 66 becomes one calling for a waiver6 of employees' 
constitutional rights if the drug testing proposed is unconstitutional. A waiver of 
employees' fundamental constitutional rights of privacy effected under a compulsory 
interest arbitration award imposed over the objection of the employees' statutory 
representative is not one consistent with public policy. Even if Cohoes were to be 
extended to make certain waivers of constitutional rights mandatorily negotiable, City 
demand 66 would not be mandatorily negotiable because the waiver of privacy rights 
sought to be effected would be contrary to public policy. 
The negotiability and arbitrability of City demand 66, therefore, depends entirely 
upon the constitutionality of the proposed drug testing. Although the constitutional 
analysis must be made because it is determinative of this aspect of the improper 
practice charge,7 it cannot be made without the benefit of a detailed factual record 
£
'County of Nassau, 27 PERB If3054 (1994). 
6Different issues would have been presented if the testing was pursuant to an 
agreement between the parties rather than an imposed award. We do not decide, for 
example, whether consent eliminates any waiver issue or whether a union is 
empowered to consent on behalf of unit employees to conduct which would be 
unconstitutional without consent. 
7Eastchester Union Free Sen. Dist, 29 PERB p 0 4 1 (1996). See also Levine v. 
Bd. ofEduc. of the City of New York, 186 A.D.2d 743 (2d Dep't 1992) (constitutional 
claim hinging upon factual issues should be first addressed by administrative agency 
with jurisdiction over dispute). 
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revealing precisely the circumstances which have prompted the demand.8 We do not 
have the record necessary to make the required analysis. The case, therefore, is 
appropriately remanded to the Assistant Director. 
For the reasons set forth above, City demands numbered 1, 42, 43, 46, 51, 54 
and 60 are mandatory subjects of negotiation. The case is remanded to the Assistant 
Director for further proceedings and such decision and order as is consistent with our 
decision herein. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
See Seelig v. Koehler, supra note 4 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BENJAMIN GADSON, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-2QQ07 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
BENJAMIN GADSON, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Benjamin Gadson to a decision by 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). Gadson 
has filed an improper practice charge against his former employer, the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District). Gadson alleges 
in this charge that the District violated §209-a.1(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it discharged him from employment and when it denied the 
contract grievance which had been filed regarding his discharge. 
The Director dismissed the discharge allegation itself as untimely because the 
charge was not filed until May 19, 1998, more than four months after Gadson was 
discharged from employment on October 10, 1997.1 The allegations relating to the 
1Section 204.1 (a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure requires charges be filed within 
four months of the act constituting the alleged improper practice. 
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District's disposition of the discharge grievance were dismissed because there were no 
facts alleged in the charge which would evidence that the District's actions were 
occasioned by Gadson's exercise of any rights protected under the Act. 
Having considered the exceptions, we affirm the Director's decision. 
Gadson's exceptions consist of a request that we order new grievance hearings 
because his union allegedly did not provide him with adequate representation during 
the grievance proceedings. This charge, however, is against Gadson's former 
employer only. There are no allegations in the charge of any impropriety by Gadson's 
union representatives. Therefore, no relief can be based on the union's misconduct 
during or after the grievance proceedings, even assuming there was inadequate 
representation at any stage of those grievance proceedings. The charge against the 
District is factually and legally deficient for the reasons stated by the Director in his 
decision. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUSEN GENCH, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASENO.U-20016 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
SUSEN GENCH, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Susen Gench to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing her 
charge alleging that the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) violated §209-a.2(a), (b) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in the manner in which it 
processed several grievances she had filed against her employer, the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District).1 Gench was 
notified by the Director that her charge was deficient in several respects. She filed two 
amendments to the charge, but the Director, finding that the second amendment still 
1The District is a statutory party to the charge pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
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had not cured the noted deficiencies, dismissed the charge.2 The Director determined 
that Gench had no standing to allege a refusal to negotiate under §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act, that the second amendment Gench had filed was not properly sworn to and could 
not be accepted3 and that the charge did not allege facts which would support a finding 
of a violation of §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act. 
Gench excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that she has submitted 
sufficient facts to support her allegations and that her pleadings meet the requirements 
of our Rules. No response has been filed by UFT or the District. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of Gench's 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
Gench is a probationary teacher. In the fall of 1997, she received what 
apparently were counseling letters from her principal4 and an unsatisfactory 
performance rating. She grieved the letters. She then went on medical leave and, 
while on leave, received an unsatisfactory rating and a recommendation that her 
probationary period be discontinued. She appealed the unsatisfactory rating. The 
appeal was held in abeyance pending the outcome of her grievances on the letters, 
2Gench's first amendment made several nonsubstantive corrections, such as 
correcting dates. 
3Section 204.1(a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) requires that improper 
practice charges, including amendments, be sworn to before a person authorized to 
administer oaths and that an original and four copies be filed. Only one copy of the 
attachments to Gench's amendment was filed. The amendment was notarized, but it 
did not contain a statement as to the truth of the content of the amendment. 
4The letters are not attached to the charge or its amendments, but they are 
described by Gench in the charge and her exceptions as letters which upset her and 
which were put into her personnel file. 
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which formed, in part, the basis for her rating. She sought and received assistance 
from UFT in the processing of the grievances and in the rating appeal.5 
Gench complains in her charge and her exceptions primarily about the delays in 
processing her grievances. She alleges that UFT's failure to have the grievance 
hearings scheduled promptly have adversely affected her ratings and her status as a 
probationary teacher. The charge and the amendments are couched in conclusory 
terms and no facts are offered which would support a finding that the UFT's decisions 
regarding scheduling were arbitrary, discriminatory or made in bad faith.6 The Director 
correctly found that absent any facts which would support a finding of a violation of the 
duty of fair representation, the charge must be dismissed. He also correctly dismissed 
the §209-a.2(b) allegation because an individual has no standing to file such a charge.7 
Even if we were to consider the facts alleged in Gench's second amendment, we 
would not reach a contrary conclusion. In fact, the documents she submitted with her 
amendment include letters from UFT representatives which outline the steps they had 
taken in the processing of both her grievances and her performance rating appeal. It 
appears that UFT's decisions, with respect to the processing of the grievances and the 
rating appeal, and the rationale behind those decisions have been clearly and timely 
5Gench was advised by UFT that the rating appeal could be held in abeyance 
until the grievances were resolved. Following UFT's advice, she opted to proceed with 
the grievances, which were then scheduled for a Step 3 hearing in June 1998. 
6
 See City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York and United Fed'n of Teachers, 
28 PERB 1J3017, at 3045 (1995). 
7
 See, e.g., Bd. ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York and United 
Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2, 21 PERB P018 (1988). 
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communicated to Gench. Additionally, the charge and amendments show that there 
has been no undue delay and no unexplained decisions made with respect to the 
processing of Gench's grievances and rating appeal.8 
Based on the foregoing, Gench's exceptions are denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott; Member 
8
 See Nassau Educational Chapter of the Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist. Unit, CSEA, 
Inc., 11 PERB1J3010, at 3020 (1978) in which it was held that a delay of thirteen 
months by the employee organization in responding to a unit employee's complaint 
"manifested grossly irresponsible conduct" constituting a violation of the duty of fair 
representation. 
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In the Matter of 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (Department 
of Correctional Services - Livingston Correctional Facility) (State) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Council 82). Council 82 alleges in this charge that the State violated §209-a.1(a) and 
(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it counseled the local unit 
president, Alfred Mothershed, for statements he made in a memorandum he wrote and 
distributed to certain unit employees. 
The ALJ held that Mothershed's comments were protected under the Act. As the 
State admittedly counseled Mothershed for the statements he made in his 
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memorandum, the ALJ held that the State improperly interfered with and discriminated 
against him in violation of the Act as alleged. 
The State argues that the ALJ's decision should be reversed because a violation 
of the Act was not proven and does not exist because an employee's disobedience of 
work rules regarding employee behavior is not and should not be considered protected 
activity. The cases relied upon by the ALJ1 are, according to the State, either 
distinguishable or, if not, they should be reversed. 
Council 82 argues in response that the ALJ's decision is correct on the facts and 
the law and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
^ ALJ's decision holding that the State violated the Act, but upon different, narrower 
) 
grounds. 
The comments for which Mothershed was counseled were contained in a 
memorandum he wrote as unit president on Council 82 letterhead and distributed to 
unit employees serving as vacation relief officers (VROs).2 Mothershed's memorandum 
was written in response to a prior memorandum issued to VROs by lieutenant 
James Munger on March 5, 1997. In that memorandum, Munger informed unit 
employees that he would start distributing vacation bid sheets six weeks in advance of 
a scheduled vacation rather than eight weeks in advance as he had been doing. Six 
1E.g., Village of Scotia v. PERB, 241 A.D.2d 29, 31 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't 
1998), conf'g 29 PERB 1(3071 (1996). 
2A VRO is a unit employee who works for another correction officer when that 
officer is on vacation. 
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weeks was the notice period established as a result of an agreement reached at facility 
labor-management meetings,3 an agreement which Munger had been disregarding. As 
found by the ALJ, Munger's memorandum confused VROs, who believed that Munger 
had changed an established policy at Mothershed's insistence when, in fact, he was 
restoring the policy that had been established by the labor-management agreement 
which Munger should have been following all along. 
In an effort to clarify the circumstances regarding vacation relief practices, 
Mothershed placed the following memorandum, dated March 14, 1997, in the VROs' 
mailboxes at the facility: 
This memo is to clarify some misconceptions that may have been created 
by the memo put out by Lt. Munger on March 5, 1997 concerning vacation 
relief. 
First, I must stress that there has been no recent change in the Local 
Labor/Management Agreement concerning vacations. The current 
agreement was altered approximately three years ago or more to 
accommodate the entire membership in regards to turning in your 
vacation or any portion there of [sic] up to six weeks prior to the beginning 
of said vacation. The practice that Lt. Munger made of handing out 
vacation bid sheets seven or eight weeks in advance created several 
problems. 
What I have done is listed some examples of what was occurring in 
certain situations that forced the union to address the problem. Although, 
this may not be the perfect policy it does create a fair and equitable 
system for all. If anyone wishes to change the current policy I have no 
problem with that and it can be brought up at a union meeting and 
discussed. If you have any questions on the examples listed below 
please feel free to contact me. 
3A correction officer need not take a vacation scheduled pursuant to bid. The 
officer may turn back the bid up to six weeks before the scheduled vacation and then 
be entitled to work the scheduled tour. Munger was requiring correction officers to turn 
back their vacation bids eight weeks in advance, apparently to the advantage of VROs, 
but to the disadvantage of the correction officers bidding for a vacation. 
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Please remember this attention to this problem was in no way an effort to 
screw anyone. If the policy had been adhered to as it was when Lt. Bivins 
was Planning Lt. this memo would not even be necessary. Don't fall prey 
to the Lt.'s divisive actions by letting him blame the union for his 
inadequacies. 
EXAMPLE #1. 
Lt. P.P. Planner distributes vacation bid sheets eight weeks prior to 
beginning of vacation group. Seven weeks prior Officer Vinnie Bag-O-
Donuts turns in all of his scheduled vacation. In the meantime, vacation 
relief Officer Chester Cheetos has already turned in his vacation bid sheet 
hoping to work Vinnie's job. 
Now, here are the facts: Vinnie turned his vacation in according to the 
proper allotted time frame and will work his bid job during that time frame. 
Chester bid the job according to the information that Lt. P.P. Planner had 
distributed. 
What that creates is Chester is now without a job for that two weeks while 
if he had a vacation bid sheet with accurate information he may have had 
the opportunity to bid a job, shift, or squad that he really would have 
wanted instead of being resource. 
***REMEMBER, if someone going on vacation turns their vacation or a 
portion of it in after the six week deadline, it is up to the Vac. Relief Officer 
to decide where he will work. 
EXAMPLE #2. 
Lt. P.P. Planner distributes vacation bid sheets eight weeks prior to 
beginning of said vacation. Officer Baseboard Cleanliness six and one-
half weeks prior to beginning of that vacation swaps his entire two week 
vacation with Officer Buff Buddy. In the meantime, Vacation Relief Officer 
Mountain Dew had already turned in his vacation bid sheet selecting 
Baseboard's vacation. 
Now, here are the facts: Officer Baseboard Cleanliness appropriately 
swapped his two weeks of vacation with Officer Buff Buddy within the time 
frames of the agreement. 
Officer Mt. Dew bid Baseboard's job, shift, and squad for the two week 
group according to the info distributed by Lt. P.P. Planner. 
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Now, the problem that creates is Buff Buddy is in a totally different job, 
squad, and shift. A job he did not bid. If he had gotten accurate 
information, he may have had the opportunity to bid another job, instead it 
is up to Lt. P.P. Planner to fix a mess he created. 
Mothershed was first verbally counseled and then he was issued the following 
written counseling memorandum by Deputy Superintendent Norman C. Bish: 
This memorandum is to confirm a counseling session I have had with you 
regarding your issuance of a To/From which I judged to be an 
inappropriate communication. 
The counseling session lasted two-days which ended on April 7, 1997, 
and was in reference to a To/From written by you and addressed to "All 
Vacation Relief Officers". We discussed its contents which I judged 
inappropriate and to be targeted against Lieutenant James Munger. 
Comments of "the Lt.'s divisive action" is inappropriate and a reference to 
"Lt. P.P. Planner" can be easily interpreted or understood to mean "Lt. 
Urine" since "p.p." is a common term. To this, you stated that is not what 
you had said or the interpretation is of the individual's [sic] and not yours. 
I feel this formal counseling session is needed because the verbal 
counseling I held with you a number of weeks ago did not have the 
desired effect of restraining your inappropriate language. This verbal 
counseling involved a To/From issued by you with the word "cojones" 
contained within. During this counseling session, you conceded that you 
should not have used this term. 
At this time, I instructed you not to issue any further memoranda that 
referred to any individual in a disparaging way. Your statement was for 
me to do what I had to do and you would do what you had to do and that 
you had "rights" that other members do not have because of your position 
as Local President. I restated that you were not to issue statements that 
discredited any individuals and that would continue to be my position 
unless otherwise instructed by Labor Relations. You seemed to accept 
my instruction and statement. 
I hope that with the receipt of this counseling you will understand the 
gravity and importance of this issue. 
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We need not decide whether Mothershed's reference to "Lt. P.P. Planner" in the 
examples he used in his memorandum is speech protected by the Act. The counseling 
given to Mothershed was not restricted to his use of that phrase. As the written 
counseling memorandum makes clear, the State counseled Mothershed because it 
considered other of his statements, apart from the quoted phrase, to be objectionable. 
The text of the counseling memorandum makes it clear that the State intends 
Mothershed to refrain from any comments which are "inappropriate". Mothershed was 
specifically counseled because he articulated an opinion that Lieutenant Munger's 
actions regarding vacation scheduling were "divisive". This statement, however, cannot 
be considered unprotected under the Act upon any standard we have ever articulated.4 
Moreover, the State instructs Mothershed not to refer to "any individual in a disparaging 
way" and to avoid "statements that discredited any individuals". 
The counseling memorandum in these respects and to this extent is overly broad 
and serves to unnecessarily chill in advance any oral or written statements that would 
enjoy the full protection of the Act. The counseling memorandum effectively prevents 
officers of Council 82 and unit employees from making comments critical of any 
decision made by any State agent. No work rule can serve as a lawful basis to counsel 
or discipline employees for speech which is statutorily protected as is Mothershed's 
memorandum apart, arguably, from his reference to "Lt. P.P. Planner". 
4State of New York (Div. of Human Rights), 22 PERB P036 (1989); Binghamton 
CitySch. Dist, 22 PERB 1J3034 (1989); Plainedge Public Sens., 13 PERB P037 
(1980); Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist, 9 PERB 1J3067 (1976). 
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Whether the State could have counseled Mothershed had the counseling been 
limited to his reference to "Lt. P.P. Planner" or any other arguable vulgarity is an issue 
which is simply not before us. The counseling, as delivered, was clearly grounded upon 
statements which are protected under the Act. As the counseling memorandum issued 
because of those statements, the violations of the Act as alleged are fully established on 
this record. 
For the reasons set forth above, the State's exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State: 
1. Immediately expunge from Alfred Mothershed's personnel and/or 
employment records any reference to the April 6-7 verbal counseling and 
the April 11, 1997 formal counseling memorandum by Deputy 
Superintendent Bish; 
2. Make Mothershed whole for any loss of wages or benefits occasioned by 
either counseling, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal 
rate; 
3. Post notice in the form attached in all locations ordinarily used by the State to 
post notices of information to employees in the unit represented by Council 82 
who work at the Livingston Correctional Facility. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Micha&kR. Cuevas, Chairman 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES" FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the State of 
New York (Department of Correctional Services - Livingston Correctional Facility) will: 
1. Immediately expunge from Alfred Mothershed's personnel and/or employment records any reference 
to an April 6-7,1997 verbal counseling and an April 11,1997 counseling memorandum by Deputy 
Superintendent Bish. 
2. Make Alfred Mothershed whole for any loss of wages or benefits occasioned by either counseling, 
with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
State of New York (Department of Correctional 
Services - Livingston Correctional Facility) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, 
or covered by any other material. 
I 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ELDORIS GARDNER, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19842 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS UNION 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
, Employer. 
ELDORIS GARDNER, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Eldoris Gardner to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his 
charge that the Law Enforcement Officers Union Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Council 82) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
by refusing to process a grievance he had filed against his employer, the State of 
New York (Department of Correctional Services) (State).1 
Gardner was notified by the Director that his charge was deficient and he filed 
two amendments to the charge in an attempt to correct the deficiencies. The Director 
) 
1The State is a statutory party to the charge pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
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determined that the charge as amended alleged only a disagreement between Gardner 
and Council 82 about whether to pursue a grievance against Gardner's supervisor, after 
disciplinary charges that had been filed against Gardner by the supervisor had been 
settled. The Director dismissed the charge because there were no facts alleged which, 
if proven, would support a finding that Council 82 had acted in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory manner or in bad faith.2 
Gardner's exceptions are basically a reiteration of his charge and amendments.3 
Neither Council 82 nor the State has filed a response. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of Gardner's 
exceptions, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
In August 1997, Gardner was involved in an altercation with his supervisor at his 
work location, Lyon Mountain Correctional Facility. Disciplinary charges were filed by 
the supervisor against Gardner. Representatives of Council 82 met with 
2
 New York State Public Employees Fed'n, AFL-CIO, 29 PERB H3019 (1996). 
3After filing his exceptions, Gardner filed an additional document with the Board, 
alleging for the first time that his grievance representative was the brother of the 
supervisor against whom Gardner sought to file a grievance. Gardner alleges in this 
amendment, which was not served on Council 82 and the State, that his grievance 
representative should have removed himself from his case. This allegation was not 
included in either Gardner's original charge or its amendments. In United Fed'n of 
Teachers and Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York (Grassel), 
23 PERB 1J3042 (1990), we declined to accept an allegation raised for the first time in 
the exceptions. Similarly, we limit our review here to consideration of the record as it 
existed before the Director, and, under the circumstances of this case (in which no 
showing of extraordinary circumstances warranting our consideration of evidence not 
previously presented is made), we will not consider Gardner's new allegation. See also 
Town of Greece, 26 PERB 1J3004 (1993); Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. (Reese), 
25 PERB 1J3012 (1992); Manhasset Union Free Sch. Dist, 24 PERB 1J3003 (1991); 
Margolin v. Newman, 130 A.D.2d 312, 20 PERB 1J7018 (3d Dep't 1987), appeal 
dismissed, 71 N.Y.2d 844, 21 PERB 1J7005 (1988). 
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representatives of the State on September 2, 1997, and reached an agreement that 
Gardner would be suspended without pay from August 25, 1997 to September 11, 1997 
in settlement of the notice of discipline. Gardner signed off on the settlement on 
September3, 1997. 
On September 12, 1997, Gardner filed a grievance against his supervisor 
alleging harassment and seeking a withdrawal of the notice of discipline and a make-
whole award. He was advised by Council 82 that the September 2, 1997 settlement of 
the disciplinary charges was a resolution of the incident that had occurred between 
Gardner and his supervisor and that the grievance would not be processed beyond 
Step 3, where it was denied by the State. He continued to seek a reconsideration of his 
grievance by Council 82 until January 9, 1998, when he was advised by Council 82 that 
his grievance was not going to be pursued because it had been resolved by the 
settlement of the notice of discipline, which Gardner had signed. 
It is well settled that in determining whether a union's failure or refusal to pursue 
a grievance violates its duty of fair representation, we must recognize "the implied 
authority of the [union] to make a fair and reasonable judgment as to whether a 
particular complaint is meritorious or is otherwise worthy of prosecution by it as a 
grievance."4 A union is under no obligation to pursue a claim which it believes, in good 
faith, lacks merit. Having made a decision in good faith as to the merits of a grievance, 
a union fulfills its duty of fair representation when it communicates its determination to 
4Nassau Educ. Chapter of the Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist. Unit, CSEA, Inc., 
11 PERB 1J3010, at 3020 (1978). See also United Univ. Professions, Inc. (Garvin), 21 
PERB P052 (1988) conf'd, 168 A.D.2d 446, 23 PERB 1J7023 (2d Dep't 1990), motion 
for leave to appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 805, 24 PERB 1J7008 (1991). 
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the grievant.5 Here, Council 82 set forth on numerous occasions its reasons for 
refusing to proceed with Gardner's grievance. The charge and its amendments allege 
no facts which, if proven, would support a finding that Council 82's decision not to 
pursue Gardner's grievance was arbitrary, discriminatory or made in bad faith. 
Based upon the foregoing, Gardner's exceptions are denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
Dated: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
5CSEA, Local 102, 20 PERB 1J3062 (1987). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LINDA AKBAR, et al. 
-and-
Petitioners, 
CASE NO. C-4723 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSIT METRO SYSTEM, INC., 
Employer. 
REDEN & O'DONNELL (JOSEPH E. O'DONNELL of counsel), for Petitioners 
JAECKLE FLEISCHMANN & MUGEL, LLP (SEAN P. BEITER of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On October 7, 1998, the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
issued a decision in the above matter finding that the petition filed by Linda Akbar, et al., to 
decertify the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1342 as negotiating representative for certain 
of its employees should be granted for lack of opposition. No exceptions have been filed to 
the decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1342 be, and 
it hereby is, decertified as the negotiating representative of the following unit of employees of 
the employer: 
Included: Paratransit operators. 
Excluded: All others. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC, LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4736 
TOWN OF DEWITT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit 1: Included: All regularly scheduled employees in the titles of Laborer, 
Laborer I (including Deputy Superintendent of Water District), 
Laborer 2 and Motor Equipment Operator (including Motor 
Equipment Operator-Garage Foreman). 
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Excluded: All other employees, including casual and seasonal 
employees. 
Unit 2: Included: Assistant Director of Recreation, Labor Crew Leader, Park 
Superintendent, Real Property Appraisal Aide/Deputy 
Assessor-Office Manager, and Senior Citizens Coordinator. 
Excluded: All other employees, including casual and seasonal 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating 
any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 687, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4805 
TOWN OF SCHUYLER FALLS, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 687 has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time Town of Schuyler Falls Highway 
Department employees, including heavy equipment operators, 
machine equipment operators, mechanics, laborers, truck drivers, . 
and working foremen. 
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Excluded: All elected officials and confidential management staff. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 687. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: November 23, 1998 
Albany, New York 
C 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
